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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY 
d/b/a NESTLE INFANT NUTRITION, 
JUL 1 7 2015 
Plaintiff, 
OE:PUW CI ,~RK SiJPERiOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
v. 
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the briefs submitted on the Motion, 
the Court finds as follows: 
It is well established that: 
[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the 
movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce 
evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a 
grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings 
are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all 
doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's 
favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73, 656 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2008) 
(quoting Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498,501(2),480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); see also 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). 
So viewed, the Complaint states the Georgia Department of Public Health 
CDPH") administers Georgia's Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children (the "WIC Program"), a federally sponsored U.S. Department of 
Agriculture ("USDA") program that provides resources to qualifying children and 
pregnant, postpartum and breastfeeding women. One benefit of the WIC Program is 
that participants can redeem vouchers for infant formula at participating WIC vendor 
stores. 
On or about May 24, 2010, DPH's predecessor, the Department of Community 
Health, issued a Request for Quote (RFQ) seeking to award a contract to a WIC infant 
formula provider and rebate vendor. The successful bidder would pay rebates for all 
infant formula purchased through voucher by WIC participants from WIC vendors in 
exchange for being named the contract infant formula manufacturer and provider in 
Georgia. 
Plaintiff Gerber Products Company d/b/a Nestle Infant Nutrition ("Nestle") was 
the successful bidder and the parties executed a contract in July 2010. The RFQ was 
incorporated into the contract. 
The RFQ provides the billing and payment requirements between DPH and 
Nestle. DPH would submit a monthly invoice to Nestle based on the number of cans of 
infant formula redeemed during the invoiced month. The invoices were prepared from 
redemption data generated and maintained by DPH pursuant to its responsibility to 
oversee and administer the WIC Program. 
Nestle was required to notify DPH within 90 days of the date on the invoice if 
there were discrepancies or errors in the invoice. If Nestle failed to notify DPH, Nestle's 
opportunity to request that funds be returned would be waived. All disputes concerning 
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rebates were required to be settled by September 30, the close of the Federal fiscal 
year. 
According to the Complaint, the invoices submitted by DPH only identified WIC 
vendors by number, not name, which made it impossible for Nestle to independently 
verify the invoices, although the contract gave Nestle the express right to audit the 
invoices being sent by DPH. Nestle initiated several attempts to audit the invoices, but 
DPH failed and refused to fulfill its audit responsibility by supplying the available data 
and information necessary for an appropriate audit to take place. DPH terminated the 
contract for convenience in 2013. Through the date of termination, Nestle had paid 
DPH $135,393,348.69 in rebates. 
After termination of the contract, Nestle learned through five criminal indictments 
and a USDA investigation that WIC vendors were taking advantage of the WIC Program 
to obtain improper financial benefits. WIC vendors were purchasing vouchers from WIC 
participants for a discounted cash payment and then depositing the vouchers and 
collecting the full value of the rebate as if the vouchers were used to purchase Nestle 
infant formula. 
The Complaint states that to the best of Nestle's knowledge, none of the sixteen 
stores named in the indictments ever actually purchased Nestle infant formula. To the 
extent vouchers were redeemed at these stores for infant formula, they did not 
represent an actual sale of infant formula and, therefore, DPH was not entitled to 
invoice Nestle. 
Nestle contends that it paid the invoices, relying on DPH's contractual 
responsibility to properly administer the WIC Program, monitor vendors, and ensure 
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vendor compliance with the WIC Program requirements. Because DPH was 
responsible for monitoring the activities of the vendors and refused to cooperate with 
Nestle's audit rights, Nestle could not monitor vendors and was prevented from 
discovering the improper redemption of vouchers, according to the Complaint. 
Nestle asserts five claims against DPH: (1) Breach of Contract (Improper 
Rebates Collected), (2) Breach of Contract (Duty to Monitor and Oversee Vendors), (3) 
Breach of Contract (Audit), (4) Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
and (5) Attorneys' Fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. DPH moves to dismiss all counts. 
I. Whether the contractual time limit to dispute invoices bars Nestle's 
breach of contract claims. 
DPH contends that Nestle is barred from asserting its breach of contract claims 
because Nestle did not assert its billing dispute within 90 days of the date of the 
invoices and, therefore, has waived its claims. This Court disagrees. Nestle has 
sufficiently pleaded its breach of contract claims to overcome DPH's defense, because 
it has pleaded facts that, if supported by evidence, could show DPH made it impossible 
or useless for Nestle to comply with the 90 day invoice dispute requirement. 
"Where a contract provides for performance of an obligation, the party bound to 
perform the obligation may be relieved and the obligation waived, where the other party 
to the contract repudiates the obligation by act or word, or takes a position which 
renders performance of the obligation useless or impossible." Taliafaro, Inc. v. Rose, 
220 Ga. App. 249, 250,469 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (1996) (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-4-23). 
Nestle alleges that it initiated several attempts to perform its contractual audit 
rights, but DPH failed and refused to fulfill its audit responsibilities and supply the data 
necessary for an appropriate audit and never provided invoice information that would 
4 
allow Nestle to link invoice amounts to actual cans of formula redeemed. Each of these 
allegations could be supported by evidence to show that DPH made it useless or 
impossible to comply with the 90 day timeframe to challenge invoices and so the Court 
finds that Nestle has sufficiently pleaded facts to overcome DPH's defense.1 
II. Whether sovereign immunity prevents Nestle from asserting DPH 
caused Nestle's non-compliance with the contract. 
Next, DPH argues that sovereign immunity bars Nestle from relying on estoppel 
to overcome its contractual requirement to dispute invoices within 90 days. This Court 
disagrees. Although Nestle states in its Complaint that DPH "is estopped ... from relying 
on the time limits provided in the Contract," Nestle is not relying on estoppel or 
requesting any form of equitable relief. Instead, Nestle asserts breach of contract 
claims and alleges DPH's breaches made it impossible or useless for Nestle to raise 
discrepancies or errors in the invoices in accordance with the contract's time limitations. 
DPH's defense of sovereign immunity has been waived as to breach of contract 
claims because of the existence of the written contract. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. 1, 
Sec. II, Par. IX (c). A State department cannot avoid a condition of contract 
performance by refusing to perform or acting in a manner that prevents the performance 
of contractual obligations. See Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. 
Doe, 278 Ga. App. 878, 882 (2006). Further, "[a] party to a contract cannot cause a 
breach or delay in compliance by the other, and then set up the breach or delay so 
1 DPH also argues that they provided all the information they were required to provide under the contract, 
any additional information would be confidential, and additional documentation would not supply accurate 
information on the actual total sales of formula. However, considering these arguments would make it 
necessary for the Court to weigh the truth of the Complaint, which it cannot do on a motion to dismiss. 
See Wright v. Swint, 224 Ga. App. 417, 418 (1997). 
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caused as freeing him from the contract." Ray M. Wright, Inc. v. Stinchcomb, 259 Ga. 
App. 212, 214 (2002). 
Sovereign immunity does not prevent Nestle from asserting that DPH caused its 
noncompliance with the contract time limitation. If sovereign immunity did prevent 
parties from asserting that their failure to comply with a contract term was caused by the 
State, the State could cause a breach and use that breach to avoid its contract 
obligations. 
III. Dismissal of Counts IV and V is improper. 
Finally, DPH's argues that Count IV for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and Count V for attorneys' fees must be dismissed because they 
cannot survive if the other claims do not. However, because the Court has found that 
the breach of contract claims survive this Motion to Dismiss, Counts IV and Valso 
survive. 
For all the above stated reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this a day of July, 2015. 
ER, SENIOR JUDGE 
rior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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